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Figure 1: D’où Venons Nous / Que Sommes Nous / Où Allons Nous (Where do we come from?What are we?Where are we going?)
by Paul Gauguin. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.
ABSTRACT
As an increasing number of interactive devices offer human-like
assistance, there is a growing need to understand our experience of
interactive agents. When interactive artefacts become intertwined
in our everyday experience, we need to make sure that they assume
the right roles and contribute to our wellbeing. In this theoretical
exploration, we propose a reframing of our understanding of the
experience of interactions with everyday technologies by propos-
ing the metaphor of companion technologies. We employ theory
in the philosophy of empathy to propose a framework for under-
standing how users develop relationships with digital agents. The
experiential framework for companion technologies provides con-
nections between the users’ psychological needs and companion
features of interactive systems. Our work provides a theoretical
basis for rethinking the user experience of everyday artefacts with
an empathy-oriented mindset and poses future challenges for HCI.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Human-centered computing→ HCI theory, concepts and
models.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a sense, my smartphone has been my longest relationship.
Feeling connected to other beings and having positive inter-
personal relationships makes us happy [28]. An essential aspect
of satisfactory human relationships is empathy [5, 6]. It has the
power to bridge the divide between two entities, bring them closer
together and support long-lasting relationships. However, humans
can experience not only a bond between themselves and other hu-
man beings, but also, amongst others, between themselves and pets
or even inanimate objects.
Concurrently, developing emotional relationships with inani-
mate objects is a strong motif in popular culture. Aaron Chervenak,
the author of the epigraph above, famously married his smart-
phone1. In the film Her by Spike Jonze [23], a man falls in love with
the artificially intelligent virtual assistant Samantha. The video
game Detroit: Become Human [3] puts the player in the middle of an
android revolution where the boundary between human and robot
emotion is blurred. Yet, life with (or next to) artificial beings is not
only an inspiring topic for artists, but it increasingly becomes part
of our experience of the world.
Beyond futuristic visions, interactive technologies which offer
human-like assistance are becoming ubiquitous. With many of us
living with a smart speaker, and some reprimanding their fellow
users for not being kind to the device [44], digital beings affect our
everyday interactions with the world and become part of our emo-
tions, evoking empathy. Consequently, empathetic and affectionate
feelings towards objects have become a topic present in a variety
of research areas [2]. For instance, Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)
1https://www.news24.com/You/Archive/this-man-married-his-smartphone-for-a-
very-good-reason-20170728
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researchers pursue the idea of robotic agents that can evoke emo-
tion and eventually become friends [36]. Marketing theory explores
ways to exploit the potential of bonds between users and specific
brands or products to increase sales [50]. Philosophers have been
discussing our relationship with inanimate artefacts for more than
a hundred years [27]. Such a multitude of perspectives on our fu-
ture emotional relationships with technology poses a challenge to
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI).
In HCI, a number of works reported on users developing relation-
ships with interactive artefacts (e.g. [32, 39, 44, 49]). However, these
accounts are often focused on one design or one specific system.
For a long time, HCI has also aimed to understand the complexity
of the user experience of technologies on the meta level. Hassen-
zahl [16] classified the experience into pragmatic and hedonic in
his seminal work. Later, the inclusion of eudaimonic qualities was
postulated by Mekler and Hornbæk [30]. While these works offer a
comprehensive view of user experience, they do not satisfyingly
address the ways in which artefacts can fulfil social needs or the de-
velopment of feelings towards objects. In these works, technology
mostly assumes one of the two roles: it either mediates empathy
between people, or it provides a feeling of being understood by
the technology. The understanding of reciprocal empathy between
humans and technology, feeling what the object is experiencing
and vice versa is currently missing in models of user experience.
This points to a lack of a theoretical understanding of empathy in
HCI.
To mitigate this, this essay uses work on empathy for objects
from philosophy and accounts of user needs from past literature in
HCI and psychology to ground a discussion around an alternative
conceptualisation of user experience that goes beyond existing un-
derstandings (e.g. [16, 30]). We introduce the concepts of companion
technologies, i.e. interactive artefacts that evoke empathy.
In line with philosophical methodology, the idea for this paper
started with a sense of wonder mixed with curiosity. We reflected
about notions of experiential qualities with interactive artefacts in
HCI. Having conducted a study of Amazon Alexa users, one of the
authors of this paper realised that they usually greeted their robot
vacuum cleaner when returning from work. They also noticed that
they were not becoming friends with the Pepper robot in their
office, despite the robot’s best efforts. Consequently, we started
to formulate questions about the role of technology in our lives
and slowly discovered that we had difficulties describing these
phenomena with the tools, theories and frameworks we already had
at hand. We asked: what does it mean to get used to an interactive
artefact? When do objects become part of our lives? Did we develop
a relationship with technologies? To answer this, we decided to
go back to basics: fine arts, pop culture and philosophy. As an
homage to this intellectual journey and because it served as a helpful
framework for our discussion, the structure of this paper is inspired
by Gauguin’s painting D’où Venons Nous / Que Sommes Nous / Où
Allons Nous (Where do we come from? What are we? Where are
we going?), also displayed in Figure 1.
Based on our theoretical exploration, we derive a framework
for companion technologies, which focuses on understanding the
experiential aspects of a socially-embedded technology. The frame-
work introduces a new dimension of user experience—empathetic
experience—which is characterised by four concepts:minded, feeling-
experience, reflective and social significance. The purpose of the
framework is to empower designers and HCI scholars alike to think
about future interactive systems as companion technologies, an-
ticipate user empathy for the designed artefacts and assure that
companion technologies seamlessly integrate with everyday ex-
perience. We use the term ‘framework’ to describe the construct
proposed in this work to highlight that we describe a system of
ideas and beliefs that can help make design decisions. Further, we
hint at Edelson’s [8] concept of frameworks as we aim to name
the set of qualities that artefacts must possess to be companion
technologies.
Our inquiry explores the premise that while companion tech-
nologies are relatively novel in our society, empathy for everyday
objects is an established theme in the humanities. In the remainder
of this paper, we first outline HCI work with a focus on concepts of
user experience. We then relate the existing theoretical understand-
ing of user experience to the theory of psychological needs. Next,
we critically discuss selected works from HCI focusing on artificial
agents, reviewing our current understanding of users’ relationships
with objects. This is followed by an overview of philosophical views
on empathy for objects. These theoretical foundations contribute
to our framework for companion technologies. We then present the
framework, detailing its components. We use two examples from
past research to show how the lens of companion technologies
can help understand the users’ empathic relationships with interac-
tive technologies. We further show how companion technologies
complement other views of socially embedded technologies and
discuss the limitations of our approach. Our work includes future
challenges for HCI that emerge from framing interactive artefacts
as companion technologies.
2 WHERE DOWE COME FROM?:
UNDERSTANDING THE USER EXPERIENCE
HCI has an established history of recognising the importance of
experiential qualities in interactive technologies and embedding
them in design. Past HCI research on experiential qualities identi-
fied pragmatic [16], hedonic [16] and eudaimonic [30] experiential
aspects. HCI research on experiential qualities builds on and is in-
spired by a variety of different research traditions (e.g. philosophy,
psychology). This leads to some conceptual similarities to other
fields as well as some differences. To explore the notion of compan-
ion technologies, we engaged with the current understanding of
user experience in HCI as well as with research traditions such as
positive psychology that define some of the experiential concepts
(e.g. eudaimonia [21]) somewhat differently.
Almost two decades ago, Hassenzahl [16] discussed pragmatic
and hedonic product qualities. In his work, he emphasises that the
perceived character of a product leads to emotional consequences,
such as the experience of joy. Pragmatic, instrumental product
qualities encompass aspects such as utility, usability, efficiency and
usefulness. Hedonic, non-instrumental product characteristics can
encompass aspects such as aesthetic appeal, fun, stimulation and
joy [7]. Mekler and Hornbæk [30] extended the notion of user ex-
perience and introduced eudaimonic quality to the HCI community.
In their empirical inquiry, they found that hedonia was mostly
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about ephemeral moments of pleasure, whereas eudaimonic quali-
ties were characterised through striving towards personal growth,
a focus on self-development and personal goals. These findings
are in line with insights from psychological works on hedonia and
eudaimonia [21]. Interestingly, in Mekler and Hornbæk’s work [30],
the hedonic and the eudaimonic were not strongly correlated to
the need for relatedness. This suggests that the experience of mean-
ing and the fulfilment of the human need for relatedness might be
addressed through experiences that are not necessarily driven by
hedonic or eudaimonic motives.
Later, Mekler and Hornbæk [31] extended their previous work
by deriving a framework of the experience of meaning in HCI.
Their framework includes five components: connectedness, pur-
pose, coherence, resonance and significance. Connectedness can be
described as feeling connected to oneself and the world. Previous
experiences as well as interactions with the world are connected to
what is happening right now in the present moment, and shape the
experience of meaning. Feeling connected to oneself is the basis of
experience of meaning. However, Mekler and Hornbæk emphasised
that, due to its elusive nature, connectedness is the most difficult
component of their framework to design for. Our work is aimed to
explore this concept further.
While these theoretical approaches to experience encompass a
wide spectrum of the ways interactive artefacts affect us and how
we perceive them, they still offer little insight into how we develop
relationships with technology. Indeed, Hassenzahl’s framework
can, for instance, reveal that voice lighting control is pleasurable,
and Mekler and Hornbæk’s can be used to show how accessing
audiobooks with Alexa can provide a meaningful experience. Yet,
we still do not know how to describe the qualities of an experience
that can lead to Alexa assuming a social role [39].
To find explanations for phenomena such as the aforementioned
one, we turn to literature on psychological needs. Psychological
needs have previously been used as a means of explaining the user
experience of interactive technologies [17].
2.1 Psychological Needs and Interactive
Artefacts
Almost two decades ago, Jordan [24] introduced his framework of
the four pleasures, physio-, socio-, psycho- and ideo-pleasure to
the research community. Jordan’s work is inspired by Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs [29]. Jordan emphasised the need to integrate
pleasure-based approaches into interactive products, and, most
importantly for this work, stated that his framework introduced
pleasures people might seek as well as pleasures products can po-
tentially address. Physio-pleasure is determined by the sensory
organs and connected to physical sensations. Socio-pleasure can
be described as the joy or the satisfaction that arises through social
interactions. Psycho-pleasures are pleasures connected to cognitive
as well as emotional reactions. Pleasures stemming from people’s
values are called ideo-pleasures.
A year later, Sheldon et al. [45] published their work on psy-
chological needs (see table 1 for an overview of the different psy-
chological needs). Their study is of particular importance for the
HCI community since one of the most influential approaches to
psychological needs in interaction design is based on their work.
More precisely, Hassenzahl et al. [17] emphasised the importance
of psychological needs for experience-oriented technology design.
Sheldon et al. [45] conducted three consecutive studies in order to
explore the importance of a variety of psychological needs. They
derived and explored ten psychological needs from a variety of the-
ories of psychological need fulfilment: self-esteem, autonomy, com-
petence, relatedness, pleasure-stimulation, physical thriving, self-
actualization-meaning, security, popularity-influence and money-
luxury (see table 1 for an overview and short descriptions). The
four most salient needs in their study were self-esteem, autonomy,
competence and relatedness, which is in line with and extends
Self-Determination Theory by Ryan and Deci [42].
In psychological research with a focus on heodnia and eudai-
monia, meaning is one of the four core definitional elements (i.e.
authenticity, meaning, excellence, growth) that encompass eudaimo-
nia [21]. Furthermore, psychological research found a bidirectional
connection between psychological need fulfilment and the concepts
hedonia and eudaimonia, e.g., [43]. This is in contrast with Mekler
and Hornbæk [31]’s work where the concept of eudaimonia was
not used in the framing of meaning. This suggests that there is a
need to further explore the concept.
The avid reader can observe that most of the psychological needs
proposed by Jordan or Sheldon have been addressed by past concep-
tualisations of user experience (see figure 2). Yet, none of the current
user experience frameworks directly addresses needs related to the
social aspects of interactions with a technological device as opposed
to the social aspects of interactions with humans mediated through
a technological device. Traditionally, the social aspect of interactive
technologies has been limited to multiple users interacting with or
through an artefact. The domain of social computing specifically
studies how social behaviour is affected by computer technology.
However, what happens when technologies become social ac-
tors? While we have known since early HCI days that technologies
can have social features [34], how do we understand the way in
which they weave themselves into the fabric of our social being?
To begin answering this question, we propose conceptualising arte-
facts that have a profound social presence as companion technologies.
Before we present our notion of companion technologies, we need
to take stock of the current sate of the art in HCI on understanding
socially embedded technologies.
3 WHAT AREWE?: CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL
AGENT TECHNOLOGIES IN HCI
In HCI, socially embedded technologies have been explored under
a variety of different names. Norman [35] discussed the chances,
challenges and myths connected to social agents. Shneiderman and
Maes [46] discussed the idea that humans will have to entrust spe-
cific tasks to digital agents. These technologies should then either
act on a user’s behalf or offer suggestions to the user. Today, the sce-
nario described by Shneiderman andMaes is reality. Artificial agents
have become ubiquitous, but the interaction between humans and
computers is still in flux. Farooq and Grudin [11] addressed this
shift by discussing the continuum from Human-Computer Inter-
action to Human-Computer Integration. They stated that the in-
teraction between humans and computers could be described as
stimulus-response and emphasised that this interaction style does
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Psychological
need
Description
Autonomy Feeling that activities are chosen by one-
self and to be the agent of one’s life
Competence Feeling effective and competent
Relatedness Feeling close to some other individual,
feelings of interpersonal connection
Self-
actualization-
meaning
Sense of long-term growth
Physical thriv-
ing
Sense of physical well-being
Pleasure-
stimulation
Feeling of pleasurable stimulation
Money-luxury Focus on wealth, luxury and nice posses-
sions
Security Feeling of order and predictability in
one’s life
Self-esteem Self-worth and global evaluation of one-
self
Popularity-
influence
Feeling of having the ability to win
friends and influence people
Table 1: Psychological needs and brief descriptions based
on the work from Sheldon et al. [45]. Note that their work
integrated a variety of different needs from other works,
such as Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory [42],
Maslow’s theory of personality [29] and Epstein’s cognitive-
experiential self-theory [10].
Figure 2: Psychological needs and the corresponding ex-
periences. Mapping of the four pleasures and hedonic-
pragmatic based on [17]. Mapping of hedonic-eudaimonic
based on [30]. Note that the mapping of meaning is based
on the interpretation of the authors of this work, as no ex-
plicit relation to the full spectrum of needs was provided in
the original paper [31].
not constitute a human-computer partnership. On a similar note,
the notion of computers as equal partners has been a longstanding
subject of critical debate within the HCI community [12]: What
constitutes a meaningful human-computer partnership that takes
user needs into account? Should computers try to understand users
in real time? Is an in-depth understanding of internal processes of
the machine needed? Do humans always keep control of the actions
of the technology? All these questions continue to be discussed, and
the notion of computers as partners is more relevant than ever [41].
HCI’s reaction to a proliferation of social agents around us has
been a very analytical one; an attempt at classifying such artefacts.
Digital game research analysed the design space of companion char-
acters in games [9]. Grudin and Jacques [15] outlined the design
space for conversational agents and discussed the term human-
computer symbiosis. Their work focused on chatbots that engage
in conversations and categorised them. Interestingly, the paper
points to contradicting empirical results regarding successful chat-
bot design. Based on the example of embedding humour in the
design of a chatbot, the authors emphasised the difficulty when
it comes to designing ‘good’ bots. While some users enjoyed the
humorous responses, the results also showed that humour led to
higher expectations towards the technology. In other words, the
designer is faced with the conundrum of personality characteris-
tics increasing the potential of positive experiences for users when
interacting with chatbots, which in turn may lead to expectations
that cannot be met. This issue illustrates how we need to better con-
ceptualise technologies which are social agents in order to design
them successfully.
Past research has also addressed specific types of agents. ‘Objects
with Intent’ was one proposed concept which included intelligent
everyday things such as lamps or jackets [40, 41]. In his recent
study, Rozendaal [41] found that the same objects can be framed as
a tool and as a partner. He listed qualities agents usually possess,
such as being social, acting autonomously, being reactive, and act-
ing proactively. Further, unlike in relationships and collaborations
between two human partners, humans have the ultimate control
in human-object partnerships. Rozendaal’s classification offers an
understanding of agents on a functional level and a discussion of
the perception of artefacts on an experiential level. What Rozendaal
does not address is a holistic understanding such artefacts on an
emotional and experiential level, one that goes beyond a specific
use case or study. For instance, we argue that humans might not
always want to be in control; that they actually enjoy passing on
some of the responsibility to an intelligent, trustworthy agent.
Given that artefacts with social agency have already been widely
discussed and studied, why do we need yet another term? First,
while an analytical approach is often worthwhile, a meta under-
standing of the problem is also required. Contrary to past efforts
that attempted to classify artefacts with social presence, we sug-
gest focusing on the experiential qualities of such artefacts per se.
Further, we agree with Grudin and Jacques [15] that managing
expectations is key in interacting with agents. Thus, we need to
understand our experience of socially embedded technologies to
know what we expect of them.
Our past experiences shape who we are [14]. Consequently. if
a user projects a personality onto an interactive artefact, this pro-
jection stems from the user’s own experiences. As expectations of
such a projection are inherently tied to past experiences, projecting
social agency onto a technology must lead to empathy for the object.
In other words, if a person projects something onto an artefact (e.g.
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a personality), this projection is intertwined with their previous ex-
periences. Thus, empathising with the projected personality is not a
possibility but a given, since the projected personality emerged from
the experiences of the person who projected it onto the artefact in
the first place. This observation is the key notion of this theoretical
exploration. However, expectations are not only set by previous
experiences that are directly related to the current situation. For
instance, users who interact with an innovative, novel technology
for the first time do not have any experience directly related to the
interaction with this novel technology. Instead, their expectations
can stem from previous experiences that go beyond directly related
incidents. For instance, the aesthetic appearance of the technology
could remind them about something they experienced in the past.
The (re)interpretation of this past experience combined with the
perception of the current situation could then potentially lead to
the person projection something onto the technology that is, as
mentioned above, tied to past experiences [14].
4 COMPANION TECHNOLOGIES
Our analysis shows that while past work addressed many notions
that help us understand socially embedded technologies, there is
a need for a meta-approach that would address, inter alia, the full
scope of psychological needs, the projection of personality onto
objects, the emergence of the computer as a partner and the inten-
tionality of objects. Consequently, we turn to the meta-science of
philosophy to propose the concept of companion technologies, which
is embedded in the philosophical notion of empathy for objects.
In order to unpack the notion of empathy for HCI, we propose
to use the term companion technologies. A companion technology
is an interactive artefact that can evoke empathy in a user.
The philosopher and poet Johann Gottfried Herder discussed
differences in the experience and the perception of different objects
such as sculptures and paintings [20]. He argued that sculptures
are made for the tactile experience, whereas paintings are made to
be looked at. Consequently, we need to ask what the purpose of
a companion artefact is. Are they made to be looked at, touched,
or experienced? We propose framing companion technologies as
artefacts that are designed to evoke an emotional response, similar
to that of interacting with another human.
We postulate using the word ‘companion’ to stress the relation-
ship between the artefact and the user. The etymology of the word
(‘one who breaks bread with another’) stresses a deep mutual rela-
tionship and a complementary duality. It emphasises the embedding
of the artefact in the everyday life of the user. This contrasts with
the term ‘partner’, which etymologically emphasises division and
evokes connotations with work environments. The term ‘agent’,
stresses acting on the world and empathy does not necessitate
active participation.
5 EMPATHY FOR OBJECTS IN PHILOSOPHY
To fully understand companion technologies as ones that evoke
empathy, we need to first analyse the concept of empathy. As part
of our theoretical exploration, we review work in philosophy about
empathy which people can develop towards artefacts. The origin
of the word empathy is the Greek empatheia (‘em’ means ‘in’ and
‘pathos’ means ‘feeling’). Empathy is ‘the ability to share someone
else’s feelings or experiences by imagining what it would be like to
be in that person’s situation’. Early work by Herder [19] described
what was later dubbed empathy as the ability of individuals to
understand, feel nature with all its manifestations in analogy to
oneself and perceive these manifestations.
Through empathy, individuals make sense of other minds [48].
In the beginning of the 20th century, empathy was a combination
of two independent philosophical traditions; philological sciences
and philosophical aesthetics. While the philological sciences mainly
focused on the notion of understanding (‘Verstehen’), philosophical
aesthetics introduced the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) per
se [48].
Theodor Lipps [27] united these two notions. For him, ‘Verstehen’
and ‘Einfühlung’ are connected as they both have to do with how
we understand phenomena that express themselves externally, but
at the same time represent an internal expression through their
external appearance. For instance, a mental state can be expressed
through an artefact (Einfühlung) or through a physical reaction
(Verstehen). Due to this affinity, these two notions have sometimes
been used interchangeably. Lipps argued further that empathy is
based on the mysterious tendency of humans to motor mimicry. He
postulated that, since this tendency is often not allowed, for instance
due to external circumstances or social norms, this interdiction leads
to ‘inhibited imitation’; an inner tendency to imitate. This led him
to explore the things and creatures which we can imitate and ask if
something or someone is a minded creature or a minded object [48].
This dilemma is still relevant today as we wonder if and when we
can ascribe social agency to objects.
Lipps was criticised by Edith Stein [47] for using the notions of
empathy (‘Einfühlung’) and feeling of being one with the other indi-
vidual or an object (‘Einsfülung’) interchangeably [48]. He reacted
to this criticism by explaining that empathetic identification did not
lead to the person losing themselves. Instead, it could be compared
to feeling the sadness communicated through a piece of art; one
can feel the sadness, but without all its motivating force [27].
The thinking of Lipps was critically questioned and further de-
veloped by Stein and Edmund Husserl. They extended the under-
standing of empathy from understanding other minds to supporting
personality development due to the ability to acknowledge, engage
and understand opinions other people have about oneself [18]. This
idea echoes our experiences with interactive agents. Individuals can
feel empathy towards companion technologies, but the companion
technology can potentially also trigger personality development
through taking an independent position and confronting the user
with content (or potentially opinions) about him or herself.
Rudolph Hermann Lotze, one of the most important philoso-
phers of the nineteenth century, had a significant impact on Lipps’s
work. Lotze and Lipps had a common view of a concept core to
HCI—experience. They defined two different kinds of experiences:
sense-experience and feeling-experience [13]. Sense-experience is
object-directed, whereas feeling-experience is self-directed. In the
description given by Lipps, experiences always embed two perspec-
tives an immediate perspective and a mediate perspective (as cited
in [13]).
Even though sometimes critically discussed, the aftereffects of
Lotze’s thinking can be found in neo-kantianism, phenomenology,
Frege’s conception of logic, psychology and theology [13, 18]. Lotze
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sees knowledge not as one system but as a variety of different views.
This view resembles the eclectic and multidisciplinary nature of
knowledge in HCI. In his work, Lotze defines beingness (‘Das Sein’)
as relations; relations as a system of interactions. Through the ex-
pression of such relations in the soul, meaning and significance
become apparent. In other words, Lotze is arguing for the predomi-
nance of the subjective mind, where all phenomena take place. The
subjective mind must strive to be objective and its integration into
reality is imperative. As we argue further below, this stance is also
applicable to companion technologies in HCI.
Lotze addressed and attempted to resolve the conflict between
scientific realism and idealism. He emphasised the enriching the
reciprocal relationship between abstract constructs of idealism and
applying them to the world. On the other hand, he remerked that
the adoption of principles focusing on the behavior of things (tak-
ing a scientific realism stance) and assuming their validity requires
idealism to some extent. We call this complementary duality. Com-
plementary duality can be a useful tool to shed light on the duality
regarding the understanding of companion artefacts in HCI re-
search. Adopting a complementary duality mindset disentangles
the differentiation between empathy for objects and the inevitable
experiential companion qualities that correlate with it.
Another key differentiation in Lotze’s work is between ‘Vorstellen’—
envisioning as a cognitive function and ‘Vorgestelltem’—the object
which is envisioned. This differentiation points towards the distinc-
tion between how a digital companion is experienced and what it
actually is. While the user and the companion technology are in a
mutual relationship, the user is the one in the active role, projecting
social features onto the artefact.
Lotze argues further that, when it comes to deciding between
different alternatives, it is not enough to consider which one of the
different alternatives is necessary. Instead, one also should consider
what is meaningful. Applying this thinking to companion artefacts
facilitates an understanding of how they can be designed and which
experiential qualities might be embodied in them. Here, Lotze’s
views echo the framework proposed by Meckler and Hornbæk [30].
Furthermore, Lotze stressed that this differentiation was not syn-
onymous of a value-system but instead was value-neutral. This is
congruent with HCI’s pursuit to build utilitarian artefacts that also
provide meaning and pleasure.
6 AN EXPERIENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COMPANION TECHNOLOGIES
Having demonstrated how work in the philosophy of empathy
aligns with the pursuits of HCI, we propose a way of conceptual-
ising companion technologies and understanding the experiences
which companion technologies evoke. Importantly, our goal is to
capture the felt experience of companion technologies and not their
true nature. We are not focusing on functionalities or technological
characteristics of artefacts and how they might be manipulated to
create a desired reaction in users’ (e.g. empathy). Our framework
explicitly extends past understandings proposed by Hassenzahl [16]
and Mekler and Hornbæk [30] by including the social aspects of the
experience between human and companion technology. Such social
aspects are crucial for companion technologies. We specifically
focus on social experiences that do not occur between two humans
Figure 3: The Experiential Framework for Companion Tech-
nologies. The framework extends our understanding of ex-
perience of technology by introducing empathetic experi-
ence. We use four concepts from philosophy of empathy to
define empathetic experience.
mediated by technology. Instead, we study social experiences be-
tween the human and companion technology. Figure 3 illustrates
the framework.
Before we describe the framework in detail, we must mention
its key limitation. As Stueber [48] noted, Lipps’s hypotheses re-
garding empathy are neither scientifically sufficiently explored nor
empirically proven. In line with the critique outlined by Stueber,
we do not argue that the notion of empathy based on Lipps’s under-
standing can necessarily lead to genuine insights about the mental
state of other individuals. On the contrary, we emphasise that it is
unimportant (from an experiential standpoint) if individuals gen-
erate what they might deem true or objective knowledge about
other individuals or objects. Instead, we extend the current under-
standing of subjective user experience and what makes interactions
with technologies meaningful. We attempt to integrate empathy
towards objects into the current understanding in HCI. Experiential
qualities caused by empathy towards objects do not stem from real
insights or true knowledge, but are sourced from the innate human
need to feel someone or something.
6.1 The Four Concepts
In line with the philosophy of empathy, we call the dimension of
experience specific to companion technologies empathetic. Empa-
thetic qualities of technologies are complementary to pragmatic,
hedonic and eudaimonic qualities. Further, we synthesise four con-
cepts from philosophical work that help in identifying empathetic
qualities in technologies. In the following, we describe these con-
cepts in detail. For each of the concepts, we list challenges for HCI
that emerge from the conceptual stance taken in our framework.
6.1.1 Minded. Firstly, we postulate that companion technologies
which evoke empathy must be minded. This concept is inspired by
Lipps’s investigations (cited by [48]) into what constitutes minded
creatures or minded objects. Building on Lipp’s thinking, humans
can experience technology empathetically if a companion technol-
ogy produces a sense of wonder. Such a sense of wonder could
stimulate people to reflect about questions such as: Is this creature
(i.e. technology) minded? What is the emotional state of this arte-
fact? If an artefact is perceived as supernatural or mystical, users
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try to make sense of it, and strive to understand if it is minded. That
is where the empathetic experience begins. Here, wondering about
the technology goes beyond wondering about how the technology
works, beyond the technical aspects of it. The technology produces
a sense of wonder in users which evokes empathetic experiences
because of the need of users to understand its mind. The spectrum
of wonderment about companion technologies ranges from joy
because the companion is perceived as amusing or helpful (e.g.
mobile digital assistants), through surprise about the efficiency of
the technology (e.g. smart home appliances), to awe because of
the incomprehensible sophistication and cognitive abilities of an
android (e.g. encountering a life-like social robot). The fascination
with the technology paired with a magical element in the interac-
tion process leads users to ask questions about themselves and the
interactive artefact. Only a companion that is perceived as minded
by the user can form a social dyad with the user. This, in turn, leads
to the user wondering about the motives of the companion and how
the companion perceives the world, thus forming an empathetic
bond with the technology. Consequently, the following challenges
for HCI arise:
Future challenges for HCI:How dowe design for mindedness
of companion technologies? How can we inform users about the
mindedness of specific companion technologies? Which design
characteristics lead to different perceptions of minds of technologies
as companions?
6.1.2 Feeling-Experience. A true companion technology enables
the user to be part of the technology’s feeling-experience (Selb-
stgefühl, as postulated by Lotze [13]). According to Lipps, sense-
experiences are object-directed, while feeling-experiences are self-
directed. For instance the feeling-experience of bodily warmth
is related to the sense-experience of the heat of the radiator. Yet,
feeling-experiences can also be object-directed, e.g. the heat of one’s
body. On the one hand, this implies that users should be able to
establish boundaries between their perceptions of themselves and
companion technologies. On the other, users are likely to project
the ability to have both kinds of feelings onto companion technolo-
gies and expect the same of the technologies. This is perhaps best
illustrated using an example. The smart oven that will switch off
when the user is manipulating food inside of it builds a perception
of knowing the user’s body heat. As the oven also communicates
its own heat, the user may perceive the experience as empathetic
because the oven and the user share a feeling-experience. Hence,
the quality of the interactive artefact being able to present itself
as capable of having feelings that are not object-directed builds
an impression of agency for companion technologies. As outlined
above, we assume that people potentially enjoy to delegate some
responsibility to a companion technology with agency. The ques-
tion remains: how can this need be translated to the design of
technologies as companions?
Future challenges for HCI:How are different levels of agency
and different levels of fidelity of companion technologies related?
How can we balance companion agency and the companion assum-
ing responsibility for tasks?
6.1.3 Reflective. Having established that a true companion tech-
nology is perceived as minded and capable of self-directed feelings,
we now turn to the feelings that the technology evokes in users
that build empathetic experience. The need to wonder about tech-
nologies and investigate if they are minded is motivated by the
fact that minded entities are able to express opinions and thus may
have opinions about the user. Here, we apply Husserl’s thinking and
stress that the empathetic experience is built by the companion tech-
nology’s perceived ability to form and engage with opinions about
the user. Consequently, how a person perceives their companion
might also change how one perceives themselves, thus giving the
companion social agency. Through these interactions and because
of developing an empathetic relationship, users have the potential
to learn and develop based on the interaction with the technology.
This is where our framework connects with eudaimonic experience,
creating a continuum of experiences.
Future challenges for HCI: How do we design for reflective
experiences with companions that motivate users to learn about
themselves and develop their potential? How can we prevent cre-
ating digital companions from exhibiting behaviours which users
perceive as judgemental?
6.1.4 Social Significance. Finally, we use Lotze’s notion of signifi-
cance to highlight how companion technologies can assume social
roles. Through the expression of relations in the soul, meaning
and significance become apparent. In order for an artefact to evoke
empathy, the relation to the object must be perceived as significant.
As a user integrates the technology into his or her everyday life,
they intentionally ascribe meaning to the actions of the objects and
thus give significance to the object’s actions. Stueber [48] implied
that empathy is the default method to build an understanding about
other minds. We extend this position and argue that empathy is
central to building an understanding of inanimate objects as well as
of the bonds people develop towards them. Thus, empathy towards
objects can be the means to explain the inexplicable. This fact is of
increasing importance as systems become more and more complex.
In this concept, our framework is also inspired by Rozendaal’s
work [41] who outlined and applied Dennett’s theory of intention-
ality. The notions of the theory of intentionality complement the
philosophy of empathy, not least because of the conceptual affinity
to folk psychology. Dennett’s theory of intentionality includes three
stances: the physical stance, the design stance and the intentional
stance. This can be explained using the example of a sundial, where
one could say that a sundial tells the time because it combines the
Sun’s altitude or azimuth with the gnomon and makes a shadow.
Seen from a design stance the sundial shows the time with the help
of the sun because it was designed to do so. From an intentional
stance, the sundial has beliefs about time, and acts on its beliefs be-
cause of a desire to show a specific time dependent on the position
of the sun. Similarly, the theory of intentionality explains the psy-
chology of how users can ascribe social significance to companion
technologies.
Future challenges for HCI: How can we manage the user’s
understanding of the companion technology and enable an evolu-
tion of understanding? How do we assure that object stay mystical
enough to remain significant? How do we design technologies that
take actions to which users can ascribe meaning?
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7 WHERE AREWE GOING?: USING THE
FRAMEWORK
So far, our framework may seem ephemeral as it is derived from
high-level concepts. To mitigate this, this section discusses two
examples from previous research on technologies that may be com-
panions. We show how our framework enables analysing the ex-
periences reported in the research and mapping the empathethic
experiences of the technologies in question.
We chose two examples of past research [4, 49] that investigated
artefacts that can be conceptualised as companion technologies.
These two papers address two companion technologies that are
present in many modern households. We chose a robotic vacuum
cleaner and a smart speaker as the two examples. These companion
technologies have different levels of complexity, offer different
functionalities and use different interaction techniques. Yet, they
share many companion qualities. While we cannot pay justice to the
two papers and analyse them in full depth, we provide an overview
of how the results presented in those works could be interpreted
with our framework. We highlight the psychological needs that can
be identified in the two examples through the application of our
framework in bold font. Please note that we highlight psychological
needs in case they were fulfilled or the potential for their fulfilment
could be identified.
7.1 Roomba
We first take a retrospective look at work by Sung et al. [49] who
investigated how users developed relationships with their robot
vacuum cleaners and the impact the device had on the home. A
key finding of the work was that users developed intimacy towards
their cleaning robots (Relatedness). Through the lens of our frame-
work, intimacy towards objects can be understood as part of the
empathetic experience. The study collected and analysed postings
from roombareview.com and conducted follow-up interviews with
30 participants. Sung et al. described their participants as Roomba
enthusiasts. Based on their data analysis they derived three themes,
Feeling happiness towards Roomba, Lifelike associations and engage-
ments with Roombas and Valuing Roomba: Promoting and protecting
it. Their findings can be explained through the lens of companion
technologies.
In general, Sung et al. [49] found that participants formed stable,
intimate attachments to their Roombas (Relatedness). This find-
ing can be explained through our framework concept of social
significance. Through integrating the Roomba into their everyday
life, it became a significant part of it. Within the theme Feeling
happiness towards Roomba, participants described situations where
the Roomba forced the whole family to be neater. This example
showcases the learning experience (Self-actualization-meaning)
we describe in the framework concept reflective. The owners of
the Roombas gave the object social agency, thus valuing the opin-
ion of the vacuum companion. In a sense, the Roomba formed the
opinion about its owners that they were untidy. Users engaged with
the companion technology and valued the opinion of the artefact.
Consequently, the whole family learned and became neater.
Interestingly, the study by Sung et al. also showed that the par-
ticipants were positive towards the reflection and learning process
triggered by the devices (Self-actualization-meaning). In con-
trast, the positive experiences with their Roomba provided a bal-
ance for extra work required for behaviour change. This shows the
differentiation we addressed in feeling-experience. The study par-
ticipants had two self-directed experiences; one was the experience
of not enjoying tidying that much, the other the experience of en-
joying the presence of their Roomba a lot (Pleasure-Stimlation).
At the same time, their Roomba had agency, making them neat and
content. Thus, the user and the Roomba shared a feeling-experience
of tidying and sharing joy (Relatedness).
Further, the results suggested the social significance of the
Roomba. The theme Lifelike associations and engagement with Roomba
showed that the participants formed an understanding about the ob-
ject and ascribed intentionality to it. For instance, participants gave
their vacuum robots names, nicknames or even changed the name
after a while so that the name fit the personality of the Roomba.
Furthermore, some described it as a valuable family member and
one participant stated that he felt a stronger bond to his Roomba
than to his mopping robot (Relatedness). This showcases that
through the integration of the object into the users’ everyday lives,
the vacuum robot assumes social roles and its social significance
increases.
As the Roomba changed from an inanimate artefact to ‘some-
thing like a pet’ or a ‘family member’, users developed a sense
of pride for the device. The results from Sung et al. showed that
participants were proud to own one (Money-luxury). Similar to
pet owners often showing pictures of their cat, Roomba owners
showed the robot to friends and family, wrote emails about its posi-
tive characteristics and worried about it when it had functionality
issues (‘the Roomba is sick’, thus capable of a feeling-experience).
To summarise, the findings by Sung et al. can be described
through the lens of our framework. The empathywhich participants
have shown towards their Roomba is reflected in the described ex-
periences as well as in the choice of words of the participants in
the study.
7.2 Amazon Echo
Next, we use our framework to understand the results of a more
recent paper. Cho et al. [4] explored how eight households used an
Amazon Echo over 12 weeks. The authors described the journey of
the study participants and their Amazon Echo. They mapped their
results onto five stages, which represent the experiential journey of
owning the device: pre-adoption, adoption, adaptation, stagnation,
acceptance. In contrast to Roombas above, this research shows the
Echo did not become a companion technology for the study par-
ticipants (Relatedness) as the devices were eventually abandoned.
Nevertheless, our framework can be applied and generate insights,
independent of the success of an interactive artefact becoming a
companion technology or not. We illustrate this in the following
paragraphs.
Initial results of the study showed that Alexa may have gained
social significance. However, the users soon started to feel dis-
appointed about the device. The technology did not live up to their
expectations. In the view of our framework, this implies that users
had the expectation of Alexa being minded. In the beginning of
the study, some participants described a sense of joy when they
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interacted with Alexa (Pleasure-stimulation), as described in our
framework concept social significance. But the sense of joy did
not evolve to wonderment about the technology nor did it offer
reflective experiences (Self-actualization-meaning). The partici-
pants did not enjoy interactingwith Alexa (Pleasure-stimulation)
and the usefulness score for the Amazon Echo was lowest in the
adoption phase.
At first glance, Alexa appears to be more sophisticated than the
vacuum robots from the previous example. But, contrasting the
two studies, users developed a more empathetic bond towards their
Roombas compared to Alexas. One potential explanation behind
this difference, based on our framework, could be that the Amazon
Echo is static, whereas the Roomba conquered personal space in the
houses and apartments of the participants. Consequently, people
started to adjust their routines and their space to the needs of
the technology and tried to make sense of the Roomba’s random
movements [49]. In contrast, participants were not ‘forced’ to make
sense of Alexa. They simply put the device in a corner and were
able to forget about it. This is reflected in the statement of one
participant in Sung et al. study who pointed out that he ‘simply
forgot about her’. As most participants did not value Alexa, it failed
to become socially significant.
One possible explanation behind Alexa’s failure could be that, in
line with previous work and results from Cho et al. [4], voice inter-
action is connected with users perceiving technology as human-like.
This raises their expectations towards the technology. We hypothe-
sise that due to this fact the expectations towards Alexa providing a
companion-like experience are higher than towards Roomba. Users
had to make a larger effort to make sense of Roomba because the
robot did not use human speech but beeping sounds instead [49].
The need for a minded Alexa was further strengthened by the
reported desire for a smart home. In the view of our framework,
this could mean that participants would have enjoyed to delegate
some responsibility to the digital companion (Autonomy), which
is addressed by the Reflective concept in our framework. The
contrast between these two cases shows that the forming of an em-
pathetic bond between the user and their (prospective) companion
technology is key for sustained use that brings joy. Failure to form
such a bond resulted in abandonment.
8 COMPANION TECHNOLOGIES AS A
COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT
While we do believe that our philosophy-driven approach to com-
panion technologies offers new ways of interpreting how users
interact with everyday objects, we recognise that our framework is
a high-level concept. Here, we discuss how companion technologies
complement other concepts, allowing for a broader scope of inquiry.
We suggest that future studies of technologies that may be com-
panions use our framework together with more specific concepts
to gain a thorough understanding of the overall experience.
There is conceptual overlap between individual components of
our work and research by Mekler and Hornbæk [31]. However,
the main differentiation between their work and ours is on the
meta-level. Mekler and Hornbæk [31] focus on the experience of
meaning in HCI (e.g. feeling connected to oneself and the world
mediated by technology). In contrast, our framework describes the
social bonds between humans and their companion technologies.
Hence, the interactive artefact evolves from a technology that me-
diates connectedness between humans to a companion technology
humans can relate to and feel connected with, without a third party
involved.
Symbiotic interactions [22] take a sensing-centered approach
to designing companion technologies. The intended role of our
work is providing an alternative perspective on the experience of
technologies that evoke empathy by adapting the philosophical
work on empathy for objects, thus allowing HCI researchers and
practitioners to use philosophical knowledge to address HCI issues.
Thus, the focus of our framework is on a persons’ experience of
a technology, rather than characteristics internal to it. Symbiotic
technologies can be combined with our approach to study the latter
aspect.
A body of work adopted a psychological approach to the issues
addressed in this paper. There is a significant body of empathy
research in social psychology (e.g. [6]) that focuses on empathy
in human relationships. Also, early HCI research addressed the
notion of computers exhibiting features perceived as having per-
sonality [33]. Based on our framework, technology can be perceived
as having a personality. However, we focus on empathetic bonds
between humans and technology with a wider scope, where per-
ceived personality can be one of a variety of contributing factors.
Later work by Turkle [51] showed that users exhibited the abil-
ity to see computers as second selves or even attribute states of
mind [52] to computer systems. Turkle et al.’s work provides a
psychological understanding of the underlying mechanisms of how
user socially relate to computer artefacts. They empirically deter-
mined that artefacts can elicit admiration, loving and curiosity. Our
work complements Turkle et al’s understanding by addressing the
phenomenological concerns behind companion technologies and
offering an explanation beyond psychology. Our work explains
the concepts behind what Turkle at al. [52] called a state of mind
through empathy and the related concept of self-mindedness.
Furthermore, our findings are related to certain concepts used
in the field of Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). Alves-Olivieira et
al. [1] experimentally manipulated empathetic actions (e.g. a robot
recalling previous experiences or reacting to emotional states of
participants). In contrast, our work does not focus on empathetic in-
teractions evoked by specific functionalities of a certain technology.
Instead, this work focuses on empathetic bonds formed due to in-
trinsic, reflective processes, independent of specific functionalities
of the interactive technology. Furthermore, we acknowledge the
conceptual closeness of the notion of Empathy for Objects to Theory
of Mind [38], which was used to interpret user interactions with
social robots, e.g. [26]. Whereas we focus on emotional experiences
embedded in the notion of empathy, theory of mind focuses on
the cognitive perspective. In a initial philosophical investigation,
Kahn et al. [25] discussed the possible emergence of new ontolog-
ical categories represented by social robots. The inquiry into the
ontology of everyday artefacts was also addressed by more recent
work in HCI [37]. While these works shared the idea of applying
a philosophical perspective with our work, they took a strictly
ontological approach. In contrast, we focus on understanding the
experience of technology, borrowing from HCI’s tradition of us-
ing phenomenology. The concepts proposed in this paper address,
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due to their philosophical embedding, the perceived experience
of objects and thus disregard the ‘objective’ nature of the object.
Consequently, technologies can be companions irrespective of their
designed social features. Thus, our work is applicable to inanimate
artefacts and not specifically to social robots (which is the focus of
HRI research).
Finally, we critically reflect on the limitations of our approach
to conceptualising empathetic user experience. We should note
that we did take a strong stance in constructing the framework
around works in the philosophy of empathy. While we chose the
works that form our framework with utmost care, the framework is
dependent on assuming that certain philosophical stances are valid.
The primary roles of the framework are serving as an analytical
lens and providing a starting point for comparison and discussion.
As long as no predictive powers are ascribed to the framework, we
believe it can fulfil its role and its conceptual criticism can enable
further contributions.
9 CONCLUSION
To broaden HCI’s discussion on technologies as social agents, this
paper outlined a framework for understanding the experience of
companion technologies—interactive artefacts which can evoke em-
pathy.We postulate that companion technologies have the potential
to fulfil psychological needs left unaddressed by past generations
frameworks of user experience. Our framework is built using no-
tions from the philosophy of empathy, focusing on empathy for
objects. We introduce four concepts that characterise empathetic
experience: minded, feeling-experience, reflective and social signif-
icance. We showed that our framework concepts can be effectively
used to analyse past work that focused on companion technologies
to understand underlying psychological needs. We also proposed
how our framework can be used with related concepts to better
understand the experience of specific interactive artefacts.
We hope that our framework and the future research challenges
for companion technologies provided can spark engaging discus-
sions in the HCI community, support designers in exploring com-
panion technologies in more depth and mitigate some of the poten-
tial challenges when designing technologies as companions.
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